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ABSTRACT 
 
In January 2008, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that trading put options of a 
company’s stock based on inside information allegedly obtained by 
hacking into a computer network did not violate antifraud provisions 
of federal securities law. The court ruled that the defendant’s alleged 
“hacking and trading” did not amount to a violation of section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, promulgated 
thereunder, because there was no proof the hacker breached a fiduciary 
duty in obtaining the information. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the District Court’s 
decision, finding that a breach of fiduciary duty was not required for 
computer hacking to be “deceptive.” This article evaluates the Second 
Circuit’s decision in S.E.C. v. Dorozhko in light of the assumption 
that liability under the misappropriation theory requires a breach of 
fiduciary duty. This article also explores how the Second Circuit’s 
decision may potentially expand section 10(b) liability to a wider 
range of parties who take advantage of access to material nonpublic 
information by trading securities based on that information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Hacking into a computer system to obtain financial information 
and trading securities based on that information may be illegal, but 
whether it constitutes insider trading under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a different matter. In 2008, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
held that a Ukrainian hacker who made almost $300,000 through 
“hacking and trading” did not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
because there was no proof the hacker breached a fiduciary duty in 
obtaining the information.1 However, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that a breach of fiduciary 
duty was not required for such “hacking and trading” to be a violation 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.2  
The Second Circuit’s opinion expands the definition of insider 
trading under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
extending liability to defendants who did not breach a fiduciary duty 
in obtaining the inside information.3 This decision challenges the 
                                                                                                             
1  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
2  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
3  Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Fiduciary Duty and “Deceptive” Fraudulent 
Conduct under Rule 10(b), N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 2009, at 3. 
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common assumption, gathered from a line of United States Supreme 
Court cases,4 that liability under the misappropriation theory requires 
a breach of fiduciary duty. The decision also differs from the dicta and 
holdings of three other circuit court decisions.5 
This Article examines and evaluates the Second Circuit’s decision 
in light of Supreme Court precedent and the assumption that liability 
under the misappropriation theory requires a breach of fiduciary duty. 
This Article then compares the Second Circuit’s decision to the 
differing circuit court rulings addressing this issue. Finally, this Article 
explores the implications of the Second Circuit’s decision and provides 
practice pointers based on these implications. 
 
I. INSIDER TRADING UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 permits the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules 
and regulations to protect the public and investors by prohibiting the 
“use or employ” of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.6 
Rule 10b-5, which implements this provision, prohibits any act or 
omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase 
                                                                                                             
4  See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the 
mere possession of nonpublic market information did not result in a duty to disclose 
under § 10(b)); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (adopting the 
misappropriation theory); S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (holding that a 
securities broker who traded securities under his client’s account and transferred the 
proceeds to his own account, amounted to a scheme to defraud that was “in 
connection with” the security transactions within the meaning of § 10(b)). 
5  See generally Regents of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 
482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Supreme Court “has established 
that a device, such as a scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of some 
duty of candid disclosure”); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(suggesting mere thieves do not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on stolen 
information); S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
defendant’s argument of being a “mere thief” was “[t]he only possible barrier to 
application of the misappropriation theory”). 
6  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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or sale of securities.7  
The Supreme Court has established that there are two compli-
mentary theories of insider trading, each with a fiduciary principle at 
its core.8 Under the “traditional theory” of insider trading liability, 
corporate insiders violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they 
trade their corporation’s securities while having knowledge of material, 
nonpublic information.9 The Supreme Court has expanded on this 
theory, holding that a corporate insider violates section 10(b) by giving 
a “tip” to an outsider for the purpose of having the outsider trade, and 
the outsider does trade.10 However, the tippee is only liable under 
section 10(b) for trading on material nonpublic information if the 
tippee is aware or should have been aware that the tipper breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee.11 
In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the 
“misappropriation theory” of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. Under this theory, a person outside the corporation violates 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates material 
nonpublic information for the purpose of trading securities without 
disclosing the use of the corporation’s material nonpublic infor-
mation.12 Instead of relying on a fiduciary relationship between the 
company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the 
misappropriation theory bases liability on a “fiduciary-turned-trader’s 
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential 
information.”13 
Although fiduciary principles underlie both theories of insider 
trading, the SEC continues to bring complaints under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty has been 
breached. Supreme Court precedent is therefore important because it 
sets the boundaries for such prosecution. 
                                                                                                             
7  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
8  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997). 
9  Id. 
10  Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
11  Id. 
12  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
13  Id. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINES DOROZHKO DID NOT VIOLATE 
SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
 
In October 2007, Oleksandr Dorozhko, a Ukrainian national, 
hacked into the computer network of Thomson Financial, Inc., 
obtaining access to IMS Health, Inc.’s soon-to-be-released negative 
earnings announcement.14 Based on this information, Dorozhko 
purchased all available put options in IMS Health, totaling 
$41,670.90.15 When the market opened the morning following the 
release of IMS Health’s third quarter earnings to the public, the stock 
plummeted and Dorozhko sold all of his 630 IMS Health put options, 
realizing a net profit of $286,456.59 overnight.16 
The SEC alleged in a complaint, filed against Dorozhko on 
October 29, 2007, that Dorozhko violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 “by either hacking into a computer network and stealing material 
nonpublic information, or through a more traditionally-recognized 
means of insider trading such as receiving a tip from a corporate 
insider.”17 The SEC also obtained “a temporary restraining order 
freezing the proceeds of Dorozhko’s trades.”18  
Relying principally on three Supreme Court opinions (Chiarella v. 
United States,19 United States v. O’Hagan,20 and S.E.C. v. Zandford21), the 
District Court determined that the “deceptive” element of section 
10(b) required a breach of a fiduciary duty.22 The District Court held 
that such “‘hacking and trading’ [did] not amount to a violation of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because Dorozhko did not breach any 
fiduciary or similar duty ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a 
                                                                                                             
14  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
15  Id. 
16  Id. at 326-27. 
17  Id. at 322. 
18  Id. at 322-23. 
19  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
20  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
21  S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
22  Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30; 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-60; Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825). 
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security.”23 Although the District Court did note that Dorozhko “may 
have broken the law,” the Court found Dorozhko not liable under 
section 10(b) “because he owed no fiduciary or similar duty either to 
the source of his information or those he transacted with in the 
market.”24 Soon after, however, the Second Circuit reversed and held 
that a breach of fiduciary duty is not a required element of a section 
10(b) complaint.25 
 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT 
 
Prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, no 
federal court had ever held that the theft of material nonpublic 
information by a corporate outsider who subsequently trades securities 
based on that information violates section 10(b).26 The Second 
Circuit’s decision negates the assumption that liability under the 
misappropriation theory requires a breach of fiduciary duty. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied primarily on the 
same three Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the District Court 
in its analysis: Chiarella v. United States,27 United States v. O’Hagan,28 and 
S.E.C. v. Zandford.29 
In its analysis, the District Court reasoned that the SEC was 
seeking to revive Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Chiarella.30 The District 
Court suggested that Dorozhko’s actions were fraudulent within the 
meaning of section 10(b) because he “stole” the information he traded 
on.31 While the District Court relied on Chiarella to further support its 
conclusion that a breach of fiduciary duty was required to uphold a 
conviction under section 10(b), the Second Circuit read Chiarella and 
                                                                                                             
23  Id. at 324. 
24  Id. 
25  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
26  Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
27 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
28 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
29 S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
30  Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
31  Id. 
6
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its dissent in a different light.  
In Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer used material non-
public information to purchase securities offered by acquiring and 
target corporations.32 The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 conviction, because the “mere possession 
of nonpublic market information” did not result in a duty to disclose 
under section 10(b).33 Since the defendant was under no obligation to 
disclose his knowledge of inside information, the defendant’s 
nondisclosure was not fraud.34 
The Second Circuit distinguished Chiarella as an example of fraud 
based on nondisclosure while Dorozhko dealt with an affirmative 
misrepresentation.35 Chiarella addressed the “legal effect of the 
[defendant’s] silence”; whether the defendant had a duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading.36 Whereas, in Dorozhko, the SEC argued that 
Dorozhko “affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access 
to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to trade.”37  
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation 
theory and held that when a person misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty to the 
source of the information, that person commits fraud “in connection 
with” a securities transaction, thereby violating section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.38 The District Court noted that the O’Hagan court’s application 
of the misappropriation theory remained consistent with the 
traditional theory, in premising “a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 on a breach of duty to disclose or abstain.”39 The District Court 
found significance in the Supreme Court’s decision not to adopt 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Chiarella, noting that the Supreme Court 
certainly could have chosen to adopt Justice Blackmun’s more 
                                                                                                             
32  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
33  Id. at 235. 
34  Id. 
35  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009).  
36  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226. 
37  Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49. 
38  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). 
39  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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expansive view of Rule 10b-5.40 The District Court therefore 
concluded, based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Chiarella 
and O’Hagan, that a breach of a fiduciary duty was required under 
both the traditional and misappropriation theory.41 
In its analysis of O’Hagan, the Second Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court had found that the defendant “had committed fraud 
through ‘silence’ because the defendant had a duty to disclose to the 
source of the information (his client) that he would trade on the 
information.”42 Similar to its analysis of Chiarella, the Second Circuit 
attempted to distinguish O’Hagan from the Dorozhko case on the basis 
of nondisclosure compared to affirmative misrepresentation. In the 
view of the Second Circuit, the defendant’s “silence” resulted in fraud 
based on the defendant’s fiduciary duty to disclose to the source of the 
nonpublic information. O’Hagan, on the other hand, did not concern 
an affirmative misrepresentation and the Court did not address 
whether the defendant would have violated section 10(b) had the 
defendant not had a fiduciary duty to disclose to the source of the 
nonpublic information. 
In Zandford, the Supreme Court held that a securities broker who 
traded securities under his client’s account and transferred the 
proceeds to his own account, committed a scheme to defraud that was 
“in connection with” the securities transactions within the meaning of 
section 10(b).43 Although the District Court conceded that Zandford 
stood for “the proposition that Dorozhko’s alleged scheme was ‘in 
connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities,” it stopped short of 
                                                                                                             
40  Id. Justice Blackmun views section 10(b) as a “catchall” provision designed to 
protect investors from unknown risks. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). In his view, the court’s approach in Chiarella, “advance[d] an 
interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that stops short of their full implications.” 
Id. at 247. Justice Blackmun would have instead held “that persons having access to 
confidential material information that is not legally available to others generally are 
prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural 
informational advantage through trading in affected securities.” Id. at 251.  
41  Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
42  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2009). 
43  S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).  
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finding Dorozhko’s alleged scheme “deceptive.”44 The District Court 
relied on Justice Stevens’ reiterations that “Zandford’s section 10(b) 
violation was predicated on his breach of fiduciary duty” to suggest 
“that there can be no ‘deception,’ and therefore no liability under 
section 10(b), absent the existence and breach of a fiduciary duty.”45 
The Second Circuit did not address this part of the District Court’s 
analysis. However, based on the Second Circuit’s final conclusion, it 
appears that the Second Circuit did not find the Zandford decision to 
be dispositive as to whether Dorozhko’s alleged scheme was 
“deceptive.” 
While the District Court relied on these three decisions to 
conclude the “deceptive” element of section 10(b) requires a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the Second Circuit concluded that “none of the 
Supreme Court opinions relied upon by the District Court . . . 
establishes a fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every 
violation of section 10(b).”46 Instead, the Second Circuit reasoned that 
“nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty” merely satisfies section 
10(b)’s requirement of a “deceptive device or contrivance,” and 
therefore does not “require a fiduciary relationship as an element of an 
actionable securities claim under section 10(b).”47 By concluding that a 
fiduciary relationship was not a required element of an actionable 
securities claim under section 10(b), the Second Circuit was free to 
adopt the SEC’s theory of fraud and determine that an affirmative 
misrepresentation to gain access to material, nonpublic information 
and then trade on that information could be “deceptive.” 
 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The Second Circuit is the first federal court to hold that theft of 
material nonpublic information by a corporate outsider and 
subsequent trading on that information violates section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. Three other Circuit Courts have addressed this issue and appear 
                                                                                                             
44  Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
45  Id. 
46  Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48. 
47  Id. at 49. 
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to side with the District Court’s decision that section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 always require a breach of a fiduciary duty. 
The dicta contained in opinions by the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits suggest that thieves of material nonpublic information do not 
violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when they trade on the basis of that 
information. In S.E.C. v. Cherif, a former employee of an investment 
bank secretly kept his key card and broke into the bank’s offices on a 
number of occasions to steal information on pending corporate 
transactions.48 He then traded securities on the basis of that 
information, making a profit.49 Though the Seventh Circuit sustained 
Cherif’s conviction on the grounds that an employee’s duty to a 
former employer is not extinguished upon termination, the court did 
comment on Cherif’s argument that he was a “mere thief” who owed 
no duty to anyone.50 The Seventh Circuit remarked that Cherif’s 
argument of being a “mere thief” was “[t]he only possible barrier to 
application of the misappropriation theory.”51 
In another court of appeals case, United States v. Bryan, the Fourth 
Circuit suggested even more forcefully that mere thieves do not violate 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on stolen information.52 The 
defendant, a former director of the West Virginia Lottery, used 
confidential information about forthcoming contracts to purchase 
shares in companies that did business with the West Virginia Lottery.53 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, choosing 
not to adopt the misappropriation theory in part because the theory 
would lead future courts to expand and eventually abandon the 
concept of fiduciary duty that lay at the heart of section 10(b).54 The 
Fourth Circuit predicted that courts would eventually be forced to 
abandon the requirement of a fiduciary duty all together and hold that 
mere thieves violated the misappropriation theory.55 
                                                                                                             
48  S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1991). 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 411. 
51  Id. 
52  United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995). 
53  Id. at 939. 
54  Id. at 951. 
55  Id. 
10
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Although both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits seem to suggest 
that “mere thieves” of material nonpublic information do not violate 
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when they trade on the basis of that 
information, it should be noted that both of these cases were decided 
before O’Hagan and the adoption of the misappropriation theory by 
the Supreme Court. The pre-dating of O’Hagan combined with the fact 
that these comments were included in the dicta of these court of 
appeals cases raises doubt as to the authority of these cases. 
The Fifth Circuit, however, held a breach of a fiduciary duty is a 
required element of a section 10(b) violation. In Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., the Fifth Circuit discussed 
how the Supreme Court “has established that a device, such as a 
scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of some duty of 
candid disclosure.”56 The Fifth Circuit made this observation relying 
on the same precedent as that of the District Court in Dorozhko.  
In summary, there is a circuit split as to whether a fiduciary duty is 
a required element of a section 10(b) violation: In the Second Circuit, 
the SEC need not prove a breach of a fiduciary duty; but in the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, the SEC must prove such a 
breach. In fact, the Second Circuit even comments that “[a]t least one 
of [its] sister circuits has made the same observation [as the District 
Court] relying on the same precedent.”57 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
 
The Second Circuit appears to have opened the door to a legal 
theory that computer hacking in connection with insider trading may 
sometimes be “deceptive” under section 10(b), while rejecting the idea 
that “deceptive” actions under section 10(b) can only occur through a 
violation of a fiduciary duty. Under the prior liability regime, a 
“paradoxical situation” existed where a person who obtained material 
nonpublic information “legally” could be held liable under criminal 
                                                                                                             
56  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007). 
57  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2009) (referring to the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 482 F.3d 372). 
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and civil securities law for trading on such information, whereas a 
thief, acting illegally, might not be.58 Without the Second Circuit’s 
ruling, this situation would continue to be exploited by information 
thieves because there would be no associated consequence, under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability, if the thief were to trade on such 
information.59 Even the District Court was aware of this situation, 
commenting that “[t]his case highlights a potential gap arising from 
reliance on fiduciary principles in the legal analysis that courts have 
employed to define insider trading.”60 
Under the reasoning used by the Second Circuit, the SEC will be 
able to bring its insider trading cases under the affirmative 
misrepresentation category to avoid having to show a breach of duty by 
the defendant.61 This newfound ability may result in broader 
enforceability under section 10(b), exposing more defendants to 
potential civil liability under the securities law.62 Both the District 
Court and Second Circuit noted that such “hacking and trading” 
schemes have typically been prosecuted under federal and state 
criminal statutes. The SEC will now be able to pursue cases of 
computer hacking as violations of federal securities laws in addition to 
violations of other federal and state criminal statutes. Thus, this 
decision will provide the SEC wide latitude in determining how to 
address securities-related misconduct, at least within the Second 
Circuit.  
The Second Circuit’s decision also has the potential to expand 
section 10(b) liability to a wider range of parties who take advantage of 
access to material nonpublic information and trade securities based on 
                                                                                                             
58  Carolyn Silane, Electronic Data Theft: A Legal Loophole for Illegally-Obtained 
Information—A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Insider Trading Law, 5 SETON 
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 333, 363 (2009). 
59  Id. However, such hackers may still be liable under mail or wire fraud, 18 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) or 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
60  S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
61  Peter Henning, On the SEC, Mark Cuban, and a Man Named Dorozhko, WALL 
ST. J., Jul. 28, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/07/28/on-the-sec-mark-cuban-
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that information. Anyone who deceptively obtains information and 
trades securities based on that information may be subjected to 
enforcement or liability, regardless of their relationship to the issuer of 
the information. Under this new regime, securities traders will need to 
be cautious as to how they come into possession of confidential 
information. If they do so in a manner that could be viewed as 
“deceptive,” then trading securities based on that information could 
violate the securities laws, regardless of whether any duty was breached. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Second Circuit’s decision appears to have expanded the 
Supreme Court’s definition of insider trading and extended section 
10(b) liability to a wider range of parties who trade securities based on 
access to material nonpublic information. This decision has opened 
the door to a legal theory that computer hacking in connection with 
insider trading may sometimes be “deceptive” under section 10(b), 
while foreclosing the argument that “deceptive” actions under section 
10(b) can only occur through a violation of a fiduciary duty. The 
impact of this decision, however, is minimized by the lack of a clear 
and consistent theory of insider trading liability as to the fiduciary duty 
requirement among the circuit courts. Given the split on this issue 
between the Second Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh 
Circuits, it is possible that the Supreme Court will review this issue in 
the near future. Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court or 
Congress intervenes, securities traders will have to monitor how they 
come into possession of confidential information. If the information is 
obtained in a manner that could be viewed as “deceptive,” then trading 
securities based on that information could violate section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 When using material, nonpublic information to purchase or sell 
securities, traders should be aware of whether they have a fiduciary 
duty to the source of the information or whether there is such a 
duty between the source of the information and a third party. If a 
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fiduciary duty does exist, a trader should not purchase or sell 
securities based on the information without disclosure. 
 Even if no fiduciary duty exists, traders should still monitor the 
manner in which material, nonpublic information is obtained if 
such information is used to purchase or sell securities. If the 
information was obtained in a manner that could be viewed as 
“deceptive,” then trading securities based on that information 
could violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the trader should 
therefore abstain from trading on the information. 
 Even if a trade based on material, nonpublic information does not 
violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, traders should still consider 
the reputational damage and significant legal expenses they may 
incur in defending such trades. In addition, traders should 
consider other potential legal consequences (e.g., mail or wire 
fraud, traditional theft theories, or other tort actions) that may 
arise through use of the material, nonpublic information. 
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